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Eine Ebene höher- Fakultäten (102446)
- Volkswirtschaft (3549)
- Lehrstühle (2340)
- Seminar für Wirtschaftstheorie (85)
- Lehrstühle (2340)
- Volkswirtschaft (3549)
Anzahl der Publikationen auf dieser Ebene: 83
Deutsch
Gebhardt, Georg und Schmidt, Klaus M. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2002):
Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen.
In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Bd. 3, Nr. 3: S. 235-255
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2002):
Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen.
In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Bd. 3, Nr. 3: S. 235-255
Englisch
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2013):
Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction.
In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Bd. 169, Nr. 1: S. 4-22
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2013):
Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction.
In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Bd. 169, Nr. 1: S. 4-22
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2012):
Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs.
In: American Economic Review, Bd. 102, Nr. 2: S. 834-864
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2012):
Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs.
In: American Economic Review, Bd. 102, Nr. 2: S. 834-864
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2013):
Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation.
In: Journal of the European Economic Association, Bd. 11, Nr. 4: S. 711-742
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2013):
Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation.
In: Journal of the European Economic Association, Bd. 11, Nr. 4: S. 711-742
Bartling, Björn und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Oktober 2012):
Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2012-27
[PDF, 291kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Oktober 2012):
Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2012-27
[PDF, 291kB]
Chmura, Thorsten und Güth, Werner
(2011):
The Minority of Three-Game. An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis.
In: Games, Bd. 2, Nr. 3: S. 333-354
[PDF, 322kB]
Cripps, Martin W.; Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Thomas, Jonathan P.
(1996):
Reputation in perturbed repeated games.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Bd. 69, Nr. 2: S. 387-410
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Thomas, Jonathan P.
(1996):
Reputation in perturbed repeated games.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Bd. 69, Nr. 2: S. 387-410
Deckers, Thomas; Falk, Armin und Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
(15. Oktober 2013):
Nominal or Real? The Impact of Regional Price Levels on Satisfaction with Life.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 450
[PDF, 863kB]
Echenique, Federico; Imai, Taisuke und Saito, Kota
(2018):
Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization.
Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 103
[PDF, 26MB]
Echenique, Federico; Imai, Taisuke und Saito, Kota
(Januar 2018):
Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice. Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations.
Englmaier, Florian; Schmöller, Arno und Stowasser, Till
(2013):
Price Discontinuities in an online used Car Market.
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(April 2004):
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2004-7
[PDF, 337kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(April 2004):
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2004-7
[PDF, 337kB]
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Januar 2001):
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2001-7
[PDF, 157kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Januar 2001):
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2001-7
[PDF, 157kB]
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2007):
Fairness and contract design.
In: Econometrica, Bd. 75, Nr. 1: S. 121-154
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2007):
Fairness and contract design.
In: Econometrica, Bd. 75, Nr. 1: S. 121-154
Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2008):
Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights.
In: Economic Journal, Bd. 118, Nr. 531: S. 1262-1284
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2008):
Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights.
In: Economic Journal, Bd. 118, Nr. 531: S. 1262-1284
Fehr, Ernst; Naef, Michael und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Oktober 2004):
The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 30
[PDF, 958kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Oktober 2004):
The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 30
[PDF, 958kB]
Fehr, Ernst; Naef, Michael und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2006):
Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment.
In: American Economic Review, Bd. 96, Nr. 5: S. 1912-1917
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2006):
Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment.
In: American Economic Review, Bd. 96, Nr. 5: S. 1912-1917
Fehr, Ernst; Näf, Michael und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Februar 2005):
The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2005-19
[PDF, 139kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Februar 2005):
The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2005-19
[PDF, 139kB]
Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Januar 2001):
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2001-2
[PDF, 191kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Januar 2001):
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2001-2
[PDF, 191kB]
Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1999):
A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Bd. 114, Nr. 3: S. 817-868
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1999):
A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Bd. 114, Nr. 3: S. 817-868
Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2007):
Adding a stick to the carrot? The interaction of bonuses and fines.
In: American Economic Review, Bd. 97, Nr. 2: S. 177-181
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2007):
Adding a stick to the carrot? The interaction of bonuses and fines.
In: American Economic Review, Bd. 97, Nr. 2: S. 177-181
Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2004):
Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model.
In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Bd. 106, Nr. 3: S. 453-474
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2004):
Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model.
In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Bd. 106, Nr. 3: S. 453-474
Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2000):
Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 44, Nr. 4-6: S. 1057-1068
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2000):
Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 44, Nr. 4-6: S. 1057-1068
Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2010):
On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Bd. 73, Nr. 1: S. 101-108
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2010):
On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Bd. 73, Nr. 1: S. 101-108
Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2004):
The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2004):
The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel.
Fehr, Ernst und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2004):
A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
In: Camerer, Colin (Hrsg.):
Advances in Behavioral Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. S. 271-296
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2004):
A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
In: Camerer, Colin (Hrsg.):
Advances in Behavioral Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. S. 271-296
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Naef, Michael
(Juni 2006):
The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences.
Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Naef, Michael
(Juni 2006):
The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences.
Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich
Flach, Lisandra und Unger, Florian
(September 2016):
Quality and Gravity in International Trade.
CESifo Working Paper No. 6080,
Nr. 12602.
Flach, Lisandra und Unger, Florian
(Januar 2018):
Quality and Gravity in International Trade.
CEPR Discussion Paper 12602,
Gebhardt, Georg und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(März 2006):
Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2006-13
[PDF, 248kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(März 2006):
Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2006-13
[PDF, 248kB]
Gual, Jordi; Hellwig, Martin F.; Perrot, Anne; Polo, Michele; Rey, Patrick; Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Stenbacka, Rune
(Juli 2005):
An Economic Approach to Article 82. Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2005-26
[PDF, 224kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Stenbacka, Rune
(Juli 2005):
An Economic Approach to Article 82. Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2005-26
[PDF, 224kB]
Hellwig, Martin F. und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2002):
Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision.
In: Econometrica, Bd. 70, Nr. 6: S. 2225-2264
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2002):
Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision.
In: Econometrica, Bd. 70, Nr. 6: S. 2225-2264
Herweg, Fabian und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Oktober 2012):
A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2012-26
[PDF, 343kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Oktober 2012):
A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2012-26
[PDF, 343kB]
Herweg, Fabian und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2013):
Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation.
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Contracts: Theory and Experiments A05-V1
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2013):
Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation.
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Contracts: Theory and Experiments A05-V1
Höffler, Felix und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2008):
Two tales on resale.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Bd. 26, Nr. 6: S. 1448-1460
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2008):
Two tales on resale.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Bd. 26, Nr. 6: S. 1448-1460
Hörisch, Hannah
(Februar 2008):
Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 230
[PDF, 1MB]
Hörisch, Hannah
(26. Februar 2008):
Does parental employment affect children's educational attainment? Evidence from Germany.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2008-5
[PDF, 191kB]
Hörisch, Hannah
(Januar 2007):
Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2007-4
[PDF, 142kB]
Hörisch, Hannah und Strassmair, Christina
(Februar 2008):
An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 229
[PDF, 338kB]
Hörisch, Hannah und Strassmair, Christina
(26. Februar 2008):
An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2008-4
[PDF, 273kB]
Imai, Taisuke und Camerer, Colin F.
(4. September 2018):
Estimating Time Preferences from Budget Set Choices Using Optimal Adaptive Design.
Imai, Taisuke; Zemlianova, Klavdia; Kotecha, Nikhil und Camerer, Colin F.
(18. September 2017):
How Common are False Positives in Laboratory Economics Experiments? Evidence from the P-Curve Method.
Irlacher, Michael und Unger, Florian
(18. Mai 2015):
Capital Market Imperfections and Trade Liberalization in General Equilibrium.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2015-6
[PDF, 540kB]
Ispano, Alessandro und Schwardmann, Peter
(2017):
Cooperating over losses and competing over gains. A social dilemma experiment.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Bd. 105: S. 329-348
Kong, Edward; Auton, Adam; Fontanillas, Pierre; Jain, Sonia; Chen, Chiayen; Stein, Murray; Bertram, Lars; Eibich, Peter; Lill, Christina; Wagner, Gert; Hammerschlaag, Anke; Posthuma, Danielle; Taskesen, Erdogan; Conlin, Andrew; Karhunen, Ville; Mannikko, Minna; Svento, Rauli; Nivard, Michel; Boomsma, Dorret; Abdellaoui, Abdel; Dolan, Conor; Wit, Harriet de; Palmer, Abraham; Mackillop, James; Sanchez-Roige, Sandra; Hofman, Albert; Ikram, M. Arfan; Tiemeier, Henning; Uitterlinden, Andre; Rooij, Frank van; Grönen, Patrick; Thurik, Roy; Beauchamp, Jonathan; Benjamin, Daniel; Biroli, Pietro; Cesarini, David; Vlaming, Ronald de; Fontana, Mark; Karlsson, Richard; Koellinger, Philipp; Laibson, David; Lebreton, Mael; Lee, James; Meddens, Fleur; Meddens, Gerardus; Okbay, Aysu; Rietveld, Niels; Turley, Patrick; Wedow, Robbee; Gratten, Jake; Johannesson, Magnus; Karlsson, Robert; Magnusson, Patrik K. E.; Bao, Yanchun; Kumari, Meena; Smart, Melissa; White, Jon; Joshi, Peter; Wilson, James; Clark, David; Buzdugan, Laura; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Hasler, Gregor; Morcillo-Suarez, Carlos; Muntane, Gerard; Navarro, Arcadi; Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Schunk, Daniel und Sutter, Matthias
(2017):
Examining the shared genetic architecture of risk tolerance and related behaviors.
In: Behavior Genetics, Bd. 47, Nr. 6: S. 692-693
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Schunk, Daniel und Sutter, Matthias
(2017):
Examining the shared genetic architecture of risk tolerance and related behaviors.
In: Behavior Genetics, Bd. 47, Nr. 6: S. 692-693
Krämer, Florentin; Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Spann, Martin ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4645-3913 und Stich, Lucas
(7. Mai 2015):
Delegating Pricing Power to Customers:
Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2015-5
[PDF, 515kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Spann, Martin ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4645-3913 und Stich, Lucas
(7. Mai 2015):
Delegating Pricing Power to Customers:
Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2015-5
[PDF, 515kB]
Krämer, Florentin; Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Spann, Martin ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4645-3913 und Stich, Lucas
(April 2017):
Delegating pricing power to customers. Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Bd. 136: S. 125-140
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Spann, Martin ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4645-3913 und Stich, Lucas
(April 2017):
Delegating pricing power to customers. Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Bd. 136: S. 125-140
Layne-Farrar, Anne und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(September 2009):
Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls”, Market Structure, and “Excessive” Royalties.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 275
[PDF, 220kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(September 2009):
Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls”, Market Structure, and “Excessive” Royalties.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 275
[PDF, 220kB]
Linner, Richard Karlsson; Biroli, Pietro; Fontana, Mark; Hammerschlaag, Anke; Kong, Edward; Lebreton, Mael; Meddens, Fleur; Nivard, Michel; Okbay, Aysu; Rietveld, Niels; Taskesen, Erdogan; Turley, Patrick; Vlaming, Ronald de; Wedow, Robbee; Abdellaoui, Abdel; Bao, Yanchun; Buzdugan, Laura; Chen, Chiayen; Eibich, Peter; Fontanillas, Pierre; Joshi, Peter; Karhunen, Ville; Lill, Christina; Meddens, Gerardus; Muntane, Gerard; Sanchez-roige, Sandra; Rooij, Frank van; Stein, Murray; Auton, Adam; Clark, David; Conlin, Andrew; Dolan, Conor; Fischbacher, Urs; Grönen, Patrick; Hasler, Gregor; Hofman, Albert; Ikram, M. Arfan; Jain, Sonia; Karlsson, Robert; Mackillop, James; Mannikko, Minna; Morcillo-suarez, Carlos; Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Smart, Melissa; Sutter, Matthias; Thurik, Roy; Uitterlinden, Andre; White, Jon; Wit, Harriet de; Bertram, Lars; Boomsma, Dorret; Fehr, Ernst; Johannesson, Magnus; Kumari, Meena; Magnusson, Patrik K. E.; Navarro, Arcadi; Palmer, Abraham; Schunk, Daniel; Svento, Rauli; Tiemeier, Henning; Timmers, Paul; Ursano, Robert; Wagner, Gert; Wilson, James; Lee, James; Gratten, Jake; Laibson, David; Posthuma, Danielle; Cesarini, David; Benjamin, Daniel; Koellinger, Philipp und Beauchamp, Jonathan
(2017):
Large-scale genetic study of risk tolerance and risky behaviors identifies new loci and reveals shared genetic influences.
In: Behavior Genetics, Bd. 47, Nr. 6: S. 651
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Smart, Melissa; Sutter, Matthias; Thurik, Roy; Uitterlinden, Andre; White, Jon; Wit, Harriet de; Bertram, Lars; Boomsma, Dorret; Fehr, Ernst; Johannesson, Magnus; Kumari, Meena; Magnusson, Patrik K. E.; Navarro, Arcadi; Palmer, Abraham; Schunk, Daniel; Svento, Rauli; Tiemeier, Henning; Timmers, Paul; Ursano, Robert; Wagner, Gert; Wilson, James; Lee, James; Gratten, Jake; Laibson, David; Posthuma, Danielle; Cesarini, David; Benjamin, Daniel; Koellinger, Philipp und Beauchamp, Jonathan
(2017):
Large-scale genetic study of risk tolerance and risky behaviors identifies new loci and reveals shared genetic influences.
In: Behavior Genetics, Bd. 47, Nr. 6: S. 651
Lucks, Konstantin E.
(2016):
The Impact of Self-Control on Investment Decisions.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2016-9
[PDF, 720kB]
Malmendier, Ulrike und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Dezember 2012):
You Owe Me.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 392
[PDF, 664kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Dezember 2012):
You Owe Me.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 392
[PDF, 664kB]
Malmendier, Ulrike und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Februar 2017):
You Owe Me.
In: American Economic Review, Bd. 107, Nr. 2: S. 493-526
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Februar 2017):
You Owe Me.
In: American Economic Review, Bd. 107, Nr. 2: S. 493-526
Nöldeke, Georg und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1995):
Option contracts and renegotiation. A solution to the Hold-Up Problem.
In: RAND Journal of Economics, Bd. 26, Nr. 2: S. 163-179
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1995):
Option contracts and renegotiation. A solution to the Hold-Up Problem.
In: RAND Journal of Economics, Bd. 26, Nr. 2: S. 163-179
Nöldeke, Georg und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1998):
Sequential investments and options to own.
In: RAND Journal of Economics, Bd. 29, Nr. 4: S. 633-653
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1998):
Sequential investments and options to own.
In: RAND Journal of Economics, Bd. 29, Nr. 4: S. 633-653
Nöldeke, Georg und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1992):
Unverifiable information, incomplete contracts, and renegotiation.
Working paper / Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics,
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1992):
Unverifiable information, incomplete contracts, and renegotiation.
Working paper / Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics,
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(November 2010):
Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 342
[PDF, 181kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(November 2010):
Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 342
[PDF, 181kB]
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Januar 2009):
The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 252
[PDF, 309kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Januar 2009):
The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 252
[PDF, 309kB]
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2005):
A comment on Gayer and Shy.
In: CESifo Economic Studies, Bd. 51, Nr. 2-3: S. 491-493
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2005):
A comment on Gayer and Shy.
In: CESifo Economic Studies, Bd. 51, Nr. 2-3: S. 491-493
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1993):
Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Bd. 60, Nr. 1: S. 114-139
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1993):
Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Bd. 60, Nr. 1: S. 114-139
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2014):
Complementary patents and market structure.
In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Bd. 23, Nr. 1: S. 68-88
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2014):
Complementary patents and market structure.
In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Bd. 23, Nr. 1: S. 68-88
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Juli 2017):
Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory.
In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Bd. 119, Nr. 3: S. 489-511
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(Juli 2017):
Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory.
In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Bd. 119, Nr. 3: S. 489-511
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2003):
Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance.
In: Journal of Finance, Bd. 58, Nr. 3: S. 1139-1166
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2003):
Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance.
In: Journal of Finance, Bd. 58, Nr. 3: S. 1139-1166
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1996):
Incomplete contracts and privatization.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 40, Nr. 3-5: S. 569-579
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1996):
Incomplete contracts and privatization.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 40, Nr. 3-5: S. 569-579
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1997):
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition.
In: Review of Economic Studies, Bd. 64, Nr. 2: S. 191-213
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1997):
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition.
In: Review of Economic Studies, Bd. 64, Nr. 2: S. 191-213
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1996):
Neuæplné smlouvy a privatizace.
In: Politicka Ekonomie, Bd. 44, Nr. 4: S. 515-523
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1996):
Neuæplné smlouvy a privatizace.
In: Politicka Ekonomie, Bd. 44, Nr. 4: S. 515-523
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1993):
Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests.
In: Econometrica, Bd. 61: S. 325-351
[PDF, 5MB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1993):
Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests.
In: Econometrica, Bd. 61: S. 325-351
[PDF, 5MB]
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2011):
Social preferences and competition.
In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Bd. 43, Nr. Suppl. 1: S. 207-231
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2011):
Social preferences and competition.
In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Bd. 43, Nr. Suppl. 1: S. 207-231
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1997):
The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation.
Discussion Paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1997):
The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation.
Discussion Paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1996):
The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach.
In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Bd. 12, Nr. 1: S. 1-24
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1996):
The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach.
In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Bd. 12, Nr. 1: S. 1-24
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2000):
The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 44, Nr. 2: S. 393-421
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2000):
The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 44, Nr. 2: S. 393-421
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2009):
The role of experiments for the development of economic theories.
In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Bd. 10, Nr. Suppl. 1: S. 14-30
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2009):
The role of experiments for the development of economic theories.
In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Bd. 10, Nr. Suppl. 1: S. 14-30
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1994):
[Rezension zu:] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tiróle, Jean: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, Mass., 1993.
In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Bd. 150, Nr. 3: S. 543-545
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1994):
[Rezension zu:] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tiróle, Jean: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, Mass., 1993.
In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Bd. 150, Nr. 3: S. 543-545
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Fey, Lisa und Thoma, Carmen
(2017):
Competition and incentives.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 98: S. 111-125
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Fey, Lisa und Thoma, Carmen
(2017):
Competition and incentives.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 98: S. 111-125
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(1997):
Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways.
Discussion Paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(1997):
Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways.
Discussion Paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(1993):
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe.
In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Bd. 17, Nr. 2: S. 264-287
[PDF, 1MB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(1993):
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe.
In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Bd. 17, Nr. 2: S. 264-287
[PDF, 1MB]
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(Juni 1993):
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe.
In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Bd. 17, Nr. 2: S. 264-287
[PDF, 1MB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(Juni 1993):
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe.
In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Bd. 17, Nr. 2: S. 264-287
[PDF, 1MB]
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(2003):
Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market.
Discussion Paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(2003):
Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market.
Discussion Paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(1995):
The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts.
In: Economics Letters, Bd. 48, Nr. 2: S. 193-199
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(1995):
The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts.
In: Economics Letters, Bd. 48, Nr. 2: S. 193-199
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(1997):
Methods of privatization: Auctions, bargaining, and giveaways.
In: Giersch, Herbert (Hrsg.):
Privatization at the end of the century. Berlin: Springer. S. 99-133
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Schnitzer, Monika
(1997):
Methods of privatization: Auctions, bargaining, and giveaways.
In: Giersch, Herbert (Hrsg.):
Privatization at the end of the century. Berlin: Springer. S. 99-133
Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Spann, Martin und Zeithammer, Robert
(Dezember 2012):
Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2012-33
[PDF, 211kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828; Spann, Martin und Zeithammer, Robert
(Dezember 2012):
Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets.
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL)
2012-33
[PDF, 211kB]
Spann, Martin ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4645-3913; Stich, Lucas und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2017):
Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing? Analyzing the "Pay What You Want" business model for open access publishing.
In: Communications of the ACM, Bd. 60, Nr. 11: S. 29-31
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4645-3913; Stich, Lucas und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2017):
Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing? Analyzing the "Pay What You Want" business model for open access publishing.
In: Communications of the ACM, Bd. 60, Nr. 11: S. 29-31